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Introduction  
 
Despite the EU’s longstanding engagement in the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is in 
the middle of what some local actors think is its most serious constitutional crisis since the war,i 
Chandler (2009: 74) is right to say that BiH is an ‘inverted state’, not representative of local 
interests, but of external agendas. It represents the EU’s ambitions in the field of peacebuilding 
(Björkdahl et al., 2009; Juncos, 2005) in the form of a slowly evolving EU Peacebuilding 
Framework (EUPF) (Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler, 2009). This is based on the liberal peace 
model and is the sum of its generally uncoordinated constituent parts, including aspirations for 
'normative power', member states’ individual interests, and the Union’s specific historical 
character in political, economic, and social terms. Such dynamics are closely related to its 
geographic sphere of influence. This is the background for the Union’s engagement in the 
Western Balkans, where the carrot of eventual membership provides a particular attraction for 
both elites and on the ground (Juncos, 2005: 98), for often different reasons not necessarily 
related to those the EU expects.  
Despite the promising prelude of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp) in the 
region, which was greeted with much enthusiasm on both sides, the success of the EUPF has 
been very limited. Rhetorically it has had a major impact on hopes for accession, and it seems to 
have had an impact in material terms and on governance even if it has not reached the heady 
heights internationals expected. Yet the lack of progress regarding the accession process 
represents a stalemate in which neither the EU nor the partners of the SAp are willing to move 
forward. The EU, as with the OHR previously, perceives this as a result of a lack of progress 
from the local politicians and the fragmented state structure.ii  
This paper attempts to explore such dynamics in the context of the EUPF, although this does 
not imply that the EUPF is a single, static and coherent model: indeed it is rather fragmented, ill-
coordinated, and represents complex negotiating processes and even dissensus over its 
objectives. It is thus no surprise we argue that in response localized peacebuilding agency is 
often expressed as resistance in order to reclaim the state from external interests. Indeed, since 
the siege of Sarajevo from 1992-5, discussions of politics and peace in BiH have been replete 
with debates about culture, identity, resistance to national and international narratives, music, 
sport, religion and alternative forms of political association.iii This has been to avoid being co-
opted by local elites and increasingly to distance itself from national and international policies. 
In such processes, local agencies develop their own alternative peacebuilding strategies. 
Uncovering such approaches depend on an ethnographic approach to understanding the types of 
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political debates that emerge from the hidden, local, spaces of peacebuilding. Our data draws on 
separate field visits conducted by the authors since 2004, interviews in formal peacebuilding 
institutions (both in BiH and abroad), focus groups and semi-structured interviews with a variety 
of actors who do not necessarily classify themselves as resistant, and less easily categorisable 
meetings with informal and localized actors; and crucially, upon the development over time of 
relationships of trust with such actors. We do not represent their views but merely discuss our 
understanding of their implications. Issues of consent and reciprocity, as well as the protection of 
sources in a tense environment, have been carefully noted. 
Consequently, this article aims to identify some manifestations of local critical agency for 
peacebuilding in BiH. To do so, a brief outline of EU engagement in the country will represent 
the basis on which some major emerging pitfalls can be identified, drawn from the broader 
critical literature on peacebuilding.  Local critical peacebuilding agencies will then be analysed, 
especially in their resistant capacity. Finally, we evaluate the interaction – or negation- of the 
EUPF and such agencies. 
 
EU Peacebuilding in Bosnia since Dayton 
 
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, the EU has shown different degrees 
of involvement in the Bosnian state. What gradually emerged in the late 90s was a regional 
approach during the course of which the EU established a coordinated set of political and 
economic conditionalities aimed at infrastructure reconstruction and institution-building. This 
became, alongside social cohesion and development, a priority between 1998 and 2000 
(European Commission, 2001), and was linked to the SAp for South-Eastern Europe in 1999 that 
was supposed to bring the countries in the region on the path to eventual European integration. 
2001 marked another important cornerstone for EU engagement in the region, not only due to the 
launch of a new programme, CARDS, but also as a result of the general strengthening of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU. Its goal was the 
implementation of the liberal peace: to strengthen the security of the EU, as well as international 
security, to international co-operation, and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Union, 1992). The 
focus of the Union mainly concentrated on harmonising Bosnian law and society with the acquis, 
for which the SAp was used. In 2005, negotiations for the country’s Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) were opened and two years later initialled in Sarajevo. In 2008, 
BiH signed the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).  
The presence of the EU in the country cannot be viewed as a coherent or homogeneous 
one, with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) playing a role closely related to the OHR and 
thus acting much more politically than the Delegation of the EU in BiH. The latter is more 
technical in its approach and less concerned with direct governance due to a stronger focus on 
member-state building and the acquis.iv  EUFOR in contrast, has a military focus, while the EU 
Policy Mission (EUPM) is working on the training and reform of the Bosnian police force. 
Despite the divisions between different EU institutions in their approach and methodology, the 
EU can be said to promote a specifically liberal version of peace. This ties in with the Union’s 
ambition to be considered a homogeneous actor in the peacebuilding mosaic. The fact that there 
are common threads running through the policies of different EU institutions are mirrored, for 
instance, in the Union’s ambitions to unify BiH to have a single interlocutor to talk to, rather 
than a number of representatives from different levels of governance.v    
Yet, the weak and potentially fragmenting state structures that the EU sees as an obstacle 
to reform may also be an outcome of a local debate about the nature of the peace being 
developed in BiH. Instead, local actors argue external actors focus on fixed, external standards, 
with little contextuality. The carrot that the EU has to offer is not modifiable and only works if 
  
3 
 
local actors comply.  This is perceived in context as undermining the peace dividend for citizens, 
and offering them dependency and conditionality, enshrined in a settlement local actors cannot 
change.  
Despite its potential to shape peacebuilding in a distinctive way to the securitized and state-
centric liberal approach, the EU has failed to learn from its mistakes, undermining its symbolic 
power to create legitimacy on the ground (Merlingen, 2007: 436; Björkdahl et al., 2009).  Yet 
although EU documentation shows some limited evidence of attempts to move beyond the 
imposition of ‘universal’ blueprints onto conflict regions those aspects that transcend these, such 
as allusions to social justice, pluralism, local ownership, normative aspirations, and internal free 
movement of people, goods, and services, have not yet reached most of the Western Balkans.  
As a result local agencies have emerged and localized peacebuilding has become resistant 
even to the ‘emancipatory project’ of liberal peacebuilders, including that of the EU (Richmond, 
2005, 2009a). This resistance has tried to reframe emancipation as local agency and autonomy, 
internationally supported, perhaps, rather than externally provided. At the national level, RS is an 
example of this. Such dynamics at grassroots level have combined some of the very norms that 
the EU sees as crucial to peacebuilding, and indicates some success in its project of engaging and 
enabling local agencies.vi It also contradicts some if its objectives in constructing a liberal, multi-
ethnic state in BiH.  
There is a tendency towards claiming autonomy from the regional and international sphere.vii 
Peacebuilding at the grassroots has become partly synonymous with independence. It has re-
politicized and given substance to the local agencies that have emerged. This can be seen in two 
ways: either peacebuilding as resistance revitalizes the liberal social contract and gives these 
externally constructed states internal substance, or it enables a more proactive encounter between 
the liberal peace and its ‘others’, in which the hegemonic weight of the liberal peace project is 
countermanded by local desires for autonomy, and local agency for emancipation (Richmond, 
2009a). 
 This raises the problem of how to identify local peacebuilding agency particularly in 
instances where it is impossible to know a priori what the ‘local’ context might entail, how it is 
made up, how it communicates via which channels, and what it is concerned with (Tocci, 2008). 
The question of agency also matters with respect to issues and demands for self-determination 
and self-governance in a post-socialist or trusteeship environment, where stakes for various 
groups are high, power becomes a key issue and competition for dominance in the self-
determination discourse is crucial for the survival of specific identity groups. This represents a 
challenge for the EU in terms of how centralized institutions may find ways of assisting such 
processes of transition from externally-led to locally-based governance. The focus of the Union 
has emerged as mainly concentrating on harmonising Bosnian law and society with the acquis, 
for which the toolbox of the SAp was used. The objective is the integration of BiH “into the 
economic and political mainstream of Europe” via the SAA process (European Commission, 
2001). This in turn is linked to the belief in the possibility of transforming the structural roots of 
conflict (Tocci, 2008: 3), coupled with the hope “that increasingly transparent economic 
liberalization will open up competition and squeezing out those entrepreneurs who have no 
managerial talents beyond extortion.” (Pond, 2006: 254).viii  
Such ambitions set into sharp relief the dissatisfaction of the population of the region, and 
especially for those concerned with the prospect of membership for BiH. Clearly, political and 
ethnic groupings have different perspectives on accession. For example, Bosniak and Croatian 
politics expect international actors (or even the OHR) to sort out or even arbitrate the current 
deadlock over accession, and ‘frozen war’ which they see as partly created by the separatist 
tendencies of Republika Srpska (RS),ix whereas Serb parties expect the issue to be resolved 
locally by a confederation in order to prevent international opposition to RS shaping the outcome 
of the accession process. They think that the stance of the EU currently, awaiting local reform 
before the process moves ahead has created unnecessary local tensions.x Indeed, it has been 
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suggested that the EU and international stance on Bosnia has imprisoned or even disabled local 
agency in unintended ways.xi 
 
 
 
Major issues  
 
Romanticising civil society 
 
Civil society has come to serve as a key area of international intervention (Belloni, 2001: 166). 
This is no different in BiH, where the focus on building civil society from the grassroots has 
emerged as a strategy to circumvent political stagnation (Fagan, 2005). An ambivalent tendency 
can be observed, given that the Commission has also adopted a hands-off approach to political 
integration, arguing that reform is up to political elites whenever an issue becomes too complex 
or cannot be agreed upon. In the context of such approaches, it is assumed that the lack of reform 
at the state level will not hinder the growth of civil society. Liberal peacebuilding relies on a 
form of civil society that is relatively free of ethno-nationalism and generally oriented towards 
the norms and values of the peacebuilding and statebuilding project, while influencing elite level 
debates to eventually move the country towards a state with the characteristics of an EU member 
state. At the same time, it is assumed that civil society will respond to the same tonic as in EU 
member states as well as consisting of similar organisational forms.  
 There is a Bosnian view that “We don’t do choirs and football clubs.”xii This critiques 
the external tendency to view Bosnian civil society as roughly compatible with, or similar to civil 
societies within the EU – which, despite the heterogeneities between countries and regions is 
seen as a homogeneous liberal network (Bono, 2006: 154). This arises out of the historical 
development of ‘civil society’ in the European context.xiii Civil society can be seen to be linked 
to specific normative prescriptions and suggestions about what the ‘ideal’ ‘civil’ society should 
look like. Ideas of what this is vary considerably, not only between different peacebuilding 
actors, but also between different EU sub-bodies, according to context and necessity.  
 However, by simplifying societal processes, international actors in conflict zones 
generally tend to romanticize local cultures by ascribing authenticity to one strand, hence 
instrumentalising a specific cultural discourse that fits into their goals of governing and shaping 
society in a given direction (Linnekin, 1991: 447). Or they operate as if there are no capacities in 
context, and so import external versions of civil society (Richmond, 2009b). In the Balkans, this 
has mainly led to a focus on ethnicity and its sovereign implications. At the same time, it is 
necessary to distance the local sphere and construct it as an isolated sphere with discrete 
boundaries in order to govern it rationally, rather than empathetically. Hence, a rather simplistic 
and undifferentiated representation of culture and identity are used to denote ‘otherness’ which 
justifies a distancing of local everyday life. Yet at the same time the agencies which stem from 
culture are not recognized by external actors.  
 There is a growing acknowledgement of such exclusionary tendencies even within the 
EU, where individual actors have claimed that the EU tends to ignore collectivities, such as 
groups which do not fit into its liberal rights or market economy framework. Some groups are 
only rarely represented in NGOs.xiv Along similar lines,  MESS (one of the biggest cultural 
institutions in the country specifically known for their theatre festivals) did not receive funding 
for a cultural initiative centering on EU-related issues, which was at the same time expected to 
have a huge influence on the public discourse about EU membership.xv The lack of support can 
mainly be attributed to the fact that the initiative was not intended to use traditional civil society 
channels (e.g. workshops, conferences, dialogue fora), but rather pursuing unconventional 
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methods in favour of a more creative approach that meant to visualize issues and potentials with 
respect to EU accession through architectural artwork in Sarajevo. In that sense, alternative 
discourses outside the civil society framework have been marginalized in the EU’s peacebuilding 
approaches, even though they may include significant and influential networks, which would be 
positive forces for peacebuilding stemming from civil society. This is the context in which the 
Centre for Human Rights in Sarajevo challenges knowledge about human rights, as an 
externalized concept taken for granted within the bigger, donor led peacebuilding projects. 
Indeed, the centre intentionally produces reports to give a voice to alternative discourses on such 
issues.xvi 
 Aiming to make civil society a simple, easily identifiable and instrumentalisable 
category, the EU tries to make it compatible with a specific set of policy tools, while supporting 
the construction of a [neo-] liberal state. The much criticized emphasis on privatisation in the 
economic sector is one of the key priority areas according to which the EU assesses ‘progress’, 
thus following the guidelines of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the country 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2009: 27). Such processes in turn have fostered the 
creation of a neo-liberal state, with NGOs often serving as a donor-led way of compensating the 
failure of the state to provide for welfare and social security. This is one of the reasons why the 
EU funds NGOs that take over such duties – the Mozaik Community Development Foundation 
being one example of this – to make up for the state’s lack of ability to provide for such services. 
Yet many organisations work only with selected communities and projects,xvii and such 
programmes can never be comprehensive or respond to the variety of needs throughout the 
country. However, they may support the EU in maintaining a sheen of legitimacy, although this 
might not always reach the peripheries.  
Failure to embed a social contract in local culture 
 
These dynamics are particularly problematic in terms of how an individual or a social group can 
have political agency and rights when materially and ideologically excluded from the 
peacebuilding project, as has been noted amongst the Bosnian peacebuilding community on 
many occasions. This ties in with discourses about the ‘spoilers’ of peace. The recent protests 
among war veterans is just one example of the contested nature of (just) peace.xviii The liberal 
peace framework offers a notion of the individual as a producer/ worker/ consumer, rather than 
as located within contextual social and cultural networks. Thus, the concept of civil society 
reflects the marketized and neoliberal ideology of already liberal developed states, where 
political rights take precedence over other capacities, expectations and experiences, in this case 
stemming from the earlier experience of socialism, from identity and culture.  
 The EU has a tendency to treat culture as an instrument that can only be considered if 
conducive to its political projects in the region, particularly with the requirements of the SAp and 
the associated conditionalities. This is reflected in the language of the Union’s policy documents 
and country assessments.xix Aspects of local culture that deviate considerably are considered a 
potential threat the ‘peace project EU’ and hence represent an obstacle to enlargement unless 
transformed by both grassroots and elite-level processes.xx In that sense, organisations 
representing less coordinated cultural elements are usually denied funding and support – this 
would be the case for most museums, choirs, galleries and musicians. On the other hand, if a 
cultural approach is linked to the goals of an official peacebuilding project, chances are much 
higher that the respective organisation will enjoy EU support. An example would be the Nansen 
Dialogue Center in Mostar, which has pursued cultural projects, but only received EU support 
for a project dealing with human rights training for teachers.xxi  
 This is linked to the assumption that Bosnia will become ‘European’ in terms of 
gradually adopting EU values and standards. There is a notion that this will be a linear and 
automatic process eventually leading to EU integration and adoption of the acquis. It is the latter 
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that the social contract is expected to emerge from, rather than from local agency, which is 
instead expected to be compliant with the Europeanisation process. 
 
 
Selective reinforcement of power structures  
 
Numerous EU policies tend to be exclusive by failing to give voice to smaller groups. As it has 
been suggested above, collectivities that are not viewed as part of the more mainstream civil 
society framework, find it difficult to get access to the public peacebuilding sphere. In this 
context, an activist pointed to past attempts to set up local organisations on an ad-hoc, and non-
professionalized basis. While he stated that donors – the EU amongst others - would generally 
not trust such projects and therefore refuse funding to them, it has been much easier for more 
'corporate', Western-based NGOs to get funds. For instance, ‘Ambrosia’, a local organisation 
founded in 1995 for the promotion of non-commercial, alternative musical performances has 
been struggling to survive and lives on the contributions of its members, whereas the 
international ‘Musicians Without Borders’, with a very similar agenda, had much easier access to 
funding due to the fact that it was established in Utrecht and could maintain closer links to 
European donors.xxii This pattern is reproduced through the levels of peacebuilding that have 
been occurring. 
 More powerful actors cannot be ignored, of course, due to their capacity to undermine 
the overall peacebuilding project. Political parties have been made a central element in the 
triangle EU-local civil society-local authorities,xxiii so that existing power relations are 
reproduced in the peacebuilding project. In this sense, definitions of ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ do not 
automatically reflect the complex and diverse debates about those issues as they occur on the 
ground. They may confer a comparatively high degree of power mainly to elites, business people 
and journalists, and those with regional rather than local connections. Ignoring those parts of 
society that cannot be reconciled in the short-run with the more ‘mainstream’ or ‘European’ ideas 
about peace has not been compensated for by local ownership rhetoric.   
  
Framing peace by state and market 
 
A key problem that is faced by the liberal peace is its tendency to be framed by the state and by 
the market. The local context is distantly engaged with through the state, or the international 
regime or institution (Richmond, 2009b). The first partner for the EU is usually the government 
and elites, while EU officials state a clear need to have an interlocutor on the state level. In that 
sense, the power of the EU is dependent on the functioning of the government and its 
coordinating system.xxiv 
This is particularly problematic in a divided country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 
engagement with the ‘state’ is not straightforward, given that RS does not feel represented by the 
central state and is therefore not willing to accept any decisions made on its behalf.xxv Indeed, in 
RS, BiH is often referred to as ‘something else’.xxvi Yet if the EU ignores such complicating 
conditions in its programmes it risks relying on a problem-solving logic and conditionalities to 
“fix” deficiencies in the political and economic system, whereas deeper issues effecting society 
and individuals in their everyday lives remain unresolved. 
 Despite the EU’s own aspirations to change traditional notions of national sovereignty it 
builds on a state-centric approach, claiming that “[t]he most important dialogue is that between 
government and civil society in the partner countries.”xxvii This relates to the assumptions local 
actors will eventually share the peacebuilders’ vision of a state and the associated form of peace. 
Indeed, the SAp that the EU concluded with BiH reflects the belief into the market as a 
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promoting tool for peace, with a clear emphasis on ‘free trade’, ‘transition into a functioning 
market economy’ and economic cooperation across the region (Council of the European Union, 
2008). Yet what emerges in discourses on the ground is a very critical stance towards the ways in 
which the state and the market are framed. This points to an obvious contradiction in ex-socialist 
countries such as Bosnia, where capitalism is often seen as predatory or playing in the hands of 
elites, has failed to culturally and economically take root, and people’s attitudes towards the state 
can be viewed as rather sceptical, given their respective historical experiences. Against this 
background, the EU prefers funding organisations that are to some extent based on a market 
and/or profit-logic and has, possibly for this reason, a long history in supporting Mozaik, an 
NGO that aims to make community life profitable.xxviii 
 
Consequences for the EU Peacebuilding Project 
 
Where are the local agencies? 
 
Such problems can mainly be attributed to international attempts to build a prescriptive 
peacebuilding framework without detailed knowledge of local agencies. This reflects the EU’s 
externalized conception of civil society. The Commission’s Mapping Study of Non-State Actors 
reflects an ambition to move towards a more sophisticated understanding of local society by 
looking at a variety of actors involved in a wide range of areas, engaging with a range of 
organisations and associations (European Commission, 2005).xxix Despite replicating problems 
relating to categorising the ‘other’ instrumentally, the report does engage with the creation of an 
‘NGO market’ and the lack of connection with the country's traditional forms of organisation. It 
points to the discrepancy between traditional and imposed organisational forms (European 
Commission, 2005: 25, 30). Yet the study excludes actors working on transitional justice, identity 
and inter-religious work, in churches, sports organisations, children’s associations, dialogue 
forums, neighbourhood, arts and writers’ organisations, as well as ad hoc and unstructured social 
movements that emerge spontaneously and often disappear quickly. This is partly why its impact 
has failed to materialize on the ground, and it has not been taken up in other policy documents, 
even within the EU. This confirms a certain degree of institutional paralysis where the EU has 
the intention of using its capacity to engage with local issues and social mobilisation, knowing 
that it needs to be more accountable to the local. Yet it fails to act because it is not in the interests 
of the institution to share its capacity and resources with locals actors who have not yet accepted 
its agendas, or are often not believed trustworthy, and who would probably attempt to 
significantly modify its local agendas.  
 However, there are significant and critical agencies within the 'local-local' (i.e. contextual 
everyday actors, representing the diversity of society) already developing their own 
peacebuilding strategies. Three categories of local agency appear to be present.  
 Firstly, some of these represent local-local actors, hidden from the external donor gaze, 
including that of the EU. The music organisation Ambrosia is an example of this, deliberately 
refusing to represent themselves as a donor-funded NGO to be flexible in their approaches and 
refusing to make compromises on their agenda. Such organisations often work on identity and 
needs related issues.  
 Secondly, others operating at this level translate donor frameworks on rights and 
institutions into local contexts or lobby internationals to do so themselves. Pravo Ljudski, a 
human rights film festival initiative, organises screenings to address human rights issues and  
even unconsciously, connect donor discourses to local perceptions and needs.xxx  
 Thirdly, others operate within the more visible realm of civil society, but maintain 
transversal connections with local-local actors and issues. An example is the Nansen Dialogue 
Center, which is locally staffed organisation, visible in the public sphere, which receives a 
considerable amount of donor support. Generally speaking, despite the EU’s apparently openness 
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to such actors, it tends only to relate to those that are both compliant and visible to its different 
wings. In that sense, ‘Mozaik’ seems a convenient partner to the EU, given that its staff members 
directly respond to the Union’s own interests and guidelines. Some organisations work directly 
within the politics of peacebuilding, while others, such as Mozaik are mainly concerned with 
community development initiatives, and do so more indirectly, but with significant impact on 
their own constitutions. They also create networks of meaning, relating culture and identity in 
positive ways to peacebuilding and politics, from which critical and resistance agency emerges. 
Such agencies and the networks they form are part of the reason why the liberal/ neoliberal 
model of state and many of the EU’s conditionalities have not been adopted. They may not be 
adopted until such policies are contextually representative as well as representative of a broader 
EU consensus. This indicates how such local agency mediates the liberal peace, projected in this 
case by the EU, and produces local-liberal forms of hybridity (Richmond, 2009a).  
 More openness, and therefore a mutual engagement with such critical peacebuilding 
agency requires an engagement with prickly and resistant groups and organisations that are hard 
to gain access to or disagree openly with liberal/ neoliberal norms, too, to take religious actors, 
ad hoc social movements, mayors, professionals, activists and students into account. It appears 
paradoxical, as the president of the alumni association ACIPS claimed, that although religious 
NGOs are trusted most in the country,
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxi they are often excluded from EU programmes. It is 
even worse for smaller organisations that address issues related to religion, but do not operate 
under the umbrella of a concrete religious community, from where they might get support. Such 
organisations, albeit working close to communities and their everyday concerns, find it 
particularly hard to get access to ‘formal’ funds.  Local groups have observed a tendency of 
donors, and particularly the EU, to avoid addressing or funding potentially sensitive policy areas, 
unwilling to risk ‘failure’ of both the liberal project and personal careers.  This in turn results 
in the Commission funding organisations it is familiar with and limits the institutional ability to 
open up channels for alternative voices.   
 This evolution of a strategy towards conditionality rather than localized legitimacy and 
consent, on the part of the EU and other donors is a response to the lack of political agreement on 
the ground, particularly at the elite level, but has followed a perverse (and classically liberal) 
course where a lack of compliance with superior external norms is met by coercion rather than 
negotiation. It has underestimated the political salience of local peacebuilding agencies in a 
range of areas, focused on externalized blueprints and norms, and thus has failed to enable the 
grassroots to maintain a social contract with elites.  
Resistance, Co-optation, and 'Apathy'  
 
The challenge is to understand what peace and justice means on an everyday level in BiH and 
how competing claims can be responded to. Such an effort involves looking at agency from a 
local perspective without preselecting, but also in the context of the evolution of the EUPF. Local 
exercises of autonomous or critical agency or resistance should not be seen as undermining the 
EUPF, but rather as a source of inspiration in terms of what the peacebuilding project 
accommodates to find a more dynamic way of engaging with local society. This is not to argue 
that local agencies are clearly 'mappable'. Indeed, Bosnian society consists of a variety of 
agencies with competing claims about the quality of peace and justice, while perceptions of these 
also change over time.xxxv  
 Local actors have, while acknowledging the benefits of peacebuilding and statebuilding in 
some areas, tended to see such processes as undermining the legitimacy of their own version of 
peace, as depoliticising, undermining their rights of self-determination and human rights, as 
portraying a lack of respect for their cultural norms, or as examples of either hegemonic or 
ideological western conditionalities. Different forms of resistance and co-optation have emerged 
on the ground, either trying to affect peacebuilding in various ways, or alternatively by 
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withdrawing from public life. Indeed, a number of actors have decided to pursue their goals in 
semi-public or even private spheres, defying control from donors and other actors that are 
perceived as either manipulating or irrelevant to public and private life. Even when local actors 
might support the introduction of elements of the liberal peace via the EUPF, they might not 
necessarily agree with the ways in which these are being implemented. Although there seems to 
be a broad consensus on the importance of human rights standards, local actors have complained 
about the fact that the Bosnian constitution impedes their application, for instance by not 
allowing people from mixed ethnic backgrounds to run for public office.xxxvi 
 In many cases, organisations are not solely engaged in resistance, but they resist specific 
elements while, at the same time supporting other elements that they see in their interests. Youth 
centres all over the country, for instance, have voiced resistance to the dominance of ‘ethnic 
language’ in the public sphere by creating spaces where ethnic identity becomes irrelevant for 
social interaction.xxxvii This certainly contradicts the language used by most peacebuilding actors, 
who have not managed to find ways to circumvent ethnic language.  
 Custom and culture are often the most immediate local sources of stability and peace on 
the one hand, but also of sustenance and resilience on the other. Culture bears a rich inventory of 
practices with which actors can makes their voices heard, for instance by comparing the social 
history of the country with the failure of the post-war peacebuilding process and the associated 
perceived loss of culture in this context.xxxviii
xxxix
 Against this background, a number of cultural 
initiatives such as theatres, museums, film producers and so forth have developed methods that 
address the country’s cultural past, at the same time pointing to issues that the peacebuilding 
context is not able to resolve.  This is not always, but often linked to a reluctance to follow 
donor logic by developing methods of working in a less professionalized, but more dynamic 
environment. The founder of the Duplex Gallery in Sarajevo, for instance, considers the gallery 
as a space of resistance, in which artists can express their needs and ideas beyond the 
prescription of donors and policy-makers.xl In a more indirect way, individual artistic directors in 
theatres resist the ways in which the international community goes about conflicts resolution by 
confronting people with their own traumas, sometimes in uncontrollable ways, for instance by 
deliberately shocking the audience in performances. xli 
 Through these processes various forms of agency, autonomy and resistance emerge at 
different levels of society. Passivity, small everyday acts of resistance, the use of local and 
customary institutions rather than the state, co-optation, or more obvious forms of non-violent 
discursive and activist all contribute to localized versions of peacebuilding. This critical 
understanding of peacebuilding at the local level often represents an attempt to avoid the 
conditionalities of the liberal and neoliberal versions of statebuilding (though it often still needs 
donor support), perhaps to replace them with a nationalist version, or more hopefully to offer an 
emancipatory version from a local perspective which does not rely on tradition state/ national/ 
ethnic/ class perspectives. Indeed, it can be argued that it is often through resistance to liberal 
peacebuilding, statebuilding, development, the market or to modern or normative praxes that a 
civil society and a social contract comes into being. In this sense, the new social contract that is 
emerging in BiH represents a reassertion of the local and an attempt to reconnect peacebuilding 
more decisively not just with discussions of governance, power and institutions, but with basic 
needs and cultural empowerment and non-ethnicized identities, in order to facilitate a civil peace.  
No stake in peace  
 
Clearly, the social, economic, and political reconstruction of BiH (or any post-conflict state) 
would be ineffective without local participation and cooperation of local political or business 
elites and civil society. There is also a need to engage with a local beneath civil society (ie. a 
local-local), which is more combative about the conditionalities, ideologies, and approaches 
associated with liberal peacebuilding. The lack of a peace dividend and so cooperation– 
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deliberate or otherwise- by local actors is derailing the EUPF, as well as provoking a contest 
between centripetal ethnic and centrifugal liberal impulses.  
 Clearly, the structural problems created by the Dayton Peace Accords remain part of the 
problem and certainly are exploited by the local actors. Internationals, in contrast, are afraid that 
including a variety of local actors would undermine its liberal ethos and lead to further state 
fragmentation. This in turn mirrors the tendency to distrust the ‘local’ and consider it inferior and 
less ‘civil’ than the ‘liberal’. Yet such dynamics of marginalisation are observable in a two-fold 
way: on the one hand, peacebuilding tends to ignore local voices in its construction of a specific 
form of peace. On the other hand, some claim that society aspires to distance itself from the 
political space, mainly because entering this space by members of one ethnic group would be 
considered as an usurpation of power by the other groups and thus constitutes a risk that people 
want to avoid.
xliii
xlii This results in a distance between the state and its citizens, with the latter 
having the impression that they do not have a stake in the former. Local actors have, for instance, 
pointed to issues related to freedom to travel, social and economic rights, ethnic discrimination 
as well as the freedom to have an understandable peace agreement and constitution.  Given 
that the DPA has not managed to take such concerns seriously in order to give Bosnians a stake 
in the peace created, local agencies are kept on the margins of a society based on an imposed, 
foreign constitution,.  
 This risks fragmenting society even further, given that individuals, families, and 
communities in a post-conflict setting need to rely on their own strategies for survival. Due to the 
inability of the free market to provide for welfare and care, people revert to subsistence 
strategies, grey or black markets or even to militias to develop a productive capacity. Indeed, 
many people point to the need for a functioning health system, social protection and the 
provision of good education as the main elements of desirable peace.xliv However, the fact that 
people feel the need to resort to informal markets undermines the capacity of the state to provide 
for a welfare system in which citizens have a stake through taxation. The EU specifically is not 
much involved in welfare and social protection issues, given that this is not an element of the 
acquis. This would at the same time require engaging with the complex structures of the state, 
which is not in line with the EU’s requirements to have a single interlocutor for the entire 
country.xlv 
 In contrast the immediacy of needs and human and political rights is a given in any 
peacebuilding context. This relative devaluing of cultural and welfare rights and needs, sheds 
doubt on whether the civil component of the liberal peace can survive, unless it reconstitutes 
itself in opposition to liberal peacebuilding and develops a strategy which reconciles difference  
and supplies welfare and representation to its participations in contextual, local terms. 
 
Co-optation of the peace project by local elites 
 
Polarized and nationalistic local political elites are opting out of the internationally backed 
liberal state building process in Bosnia, as recent developments in RS illustrate. This lack of 
cooperation is derailing the EUPF’s attempt to promote the construction of a multi-ethic and 
democratic state, perhaps because a liberal democratic state would ultimately undermine elite 
political, social and cultural power bases. The resultant political stalemate between nationalist 
groups, particularly in parliament raises the questions of why the liberal peace has not been taken 
up, why it remains in the executive sphere of international peacebuilders, and what can be done 
about this, especially when those who were implicated in the promotion of such a state-centric 
version of peace in BiH complain that the country is slipping back towards war (Ashdown & 
Holbrooke, 2008). 
Local dissent has derailed the liberal peace by opting out, forcing it down a path towards 
either illiberalism of the partition of the polity into mono-ethnic units. Yet, from the perspective 
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of local-local actors in Bosnia, many of whom look to the EUPF for their salvation, peace is 
rooted in an authentic and localized version of everyday life, also anchored within the normative 
and political framework of the EU as well as a potentially post-Dayton state. The nationalist 
rhetoric of ethnic parties remains. Indeed, pluralism is seen by some nationalists as a way of 
eliminating difference rather than accommodating it.
xlvii
xlvi From this perspective, peace would 
represent the accommodation of these different dynamics. EU accession is seen as both 
providing this and simultaneously as a way of sidestepping the very difficult questions and issues 
that political reconciliation leads to (as a result there is also a suspicion that there exists some 
local contempt for the internationals’ liberal agenda).   
Local elites tend to only adopt reforms that do not undermine their power base, thus co-
opting peacebuilding. There is a consensus among politicians of various backgrounds about EU 
accessionxlviii even though there are differing views on the ground. This shows the extent to 
which politicians claim to speak on behalf of Bosnian society, assuming a high degree of 
homogeneity, which clearly relates to contradictory policy goals. Local politicians develop 
agency in their interactions with the international community by disempowering society. This 
reflects the extent to which national elites are capable of instrumentalising peacebuilding 
discourses to undermine local-local agency while also using it to modify the approach of 
international actors.  
 
 
Lack of space for the development of local peace dynamics  
 
From the local perspective of peacebuilding in BiH, states, institutions and governmental 
practices have displaced aspects of human needs in order to place an emphasis on political rights. 
Not only does this limit local opportunities to design the peace process, but it is also seen 
critically by some local actors, who want the EU to just ‘let them live’ instead of interfering in 
all aspects of daily life.xlix Yet, local attempts to develop their own, distinctive processes of 
reconstruction and governance after conflict and the space for alternative social processes has 
been reduced by external actors to make peacebuilding less ‘problematic’ or ‘complicated’.  
Many local peacebuilding agencies, NGOs, social movements, non-secular identities, and 
even claims to customary forms of ‘neighbourliness’, have been overlooked in BiH. Accession 
criteria have also reduced their space for expression, and EU project planning drives an 
uncontextual agenda of liberal governance and modernisation not locally resonant or necessarily 
locally legitimate. Instead it has focused on regional rather than contextual legitimacy. As a 
result many local peacebuilding actors hold the view that reconciliation is now about both 
transgressing both ethnic identity and the role of internationals in pushing for a specific form of 
state. This has produced a situation of competition 'until death' between politicians, civil society, 
between NGOs, rather than facilitating a political debate about the nature of peace that might 
emerge free of external conditionality. In general terms, such local, critical agencies, seem to 
concur on the possibilities of social democracy and EU entry in a loose confederation. But such 
possibilities are censored by international actors.  
 This is the background against which ‘peacebuilding as resistance’ has emerged, 
indicating processes by which local actors develop their own peacebuilding strategies that run 
parallel to or impede the EUPF approach. Some organisations, which are considered as a risk to 
peacebuilding and hence marginalized by funding and peacebuilding discourses, have chosen to 
‘go underground’, working in hidden spaces and often paying for their activities from their own 
pockets.l As a result, parallel structures and locations of agency have emerged, developing 
distinct forms of peacebuilding. Given that such parallel local approaches, where they are 
apparent at all, are often internationally viewed as inferior and in need of transformation, there 
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has developed significant tension, especially in critical local discourses, between the EUPF and 
those marginalized, disempowered or disappointed by it.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: A challenge for the EU 
 
Given these major problems with liberal peacebuilding, the EUPF in BiH faces a major 
challenge. This relates in particular to the need to recognize and respond to unfamiliar local 
critical agencies and resistance in more positive forms than merely downplaying complexities of 
local processes. Some key areas remain worth considering. There is a need to rethink the social 
contract that is established. In Bosnia, there is no real chain of accountability and responsibility 
between the implementing agencies and the people on the ground. The legitimacy of a ‘new’ 
social contract would rest upon its provision of social, cultural, economic and political resources 
sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local, everyday, constituencies as they define 
themselves, and an international community of which they should be a stakeholder. Instead of 
displacing local agency with inflexible institutions that obscure the everyday, this would 
represent an international-local social contract in an evolving form, focusing on an everyday 
peace, and the necessary emancipatory and empathetic structures and institutions this may 
require.  
 The failure of the EUPF so far in Bosnia can partly be ascribed to the fact that a high 
number of ‘uncomfortable’ voices have been mostly excluded. This has been reduced to the 
consultation of local elites and those already in power, hence preventing a deeper 
contextualisation of peace in its very social and cultural background. Herein lies local legitimacy 
for the state, represents political agency and requires autonomy. They are essential parts not just 
of a democratic process but also a social and economic discussion about what the state is for and 
what type of peace it produces locally, regionally and internationally. Peace, in turn, is about the 
attempted restoration of resonant normality to everyday life taking the interaction of those 
processes into account. In this context, empathy and an aspiration towards self-government (not 
in neoliberal terms), especially within a ‘deep civil society’ (the local-local) derived from a more 
empathetic engagement, offers a conceptual way forward.  
Local actors are materially and discursively able to resist external demands and 
implications. This exertion of critical forms of local and often marginal agency occurs on a very 
small and fragmented scale, but it is effective. Resistance can occur in different ways, such as 
operating in ‘hidden spaces’ provided by cultural or customary frameworks, creating small civil 
society organisations for advocacy, for identity, needs, or rights purposes, vocal and physical 
resistance, discursive deconstruction or co-option of institutional frameworks for their 
governance, and through a process of negotiation over the nature of the peace that is being laid 
down. Indeed such resistance often results in a subtle co-option, rather than outright rejection, of 
the liberal peacebuilding process by local actors who are assumed to be its subjects, as has 
occurred recently for example in Kosovo (Richmond & Franks, 2009). This produces hybrid 
forms of peace, representative of local forms of agency and their unexpected capacities. This 
argument does not represent a reification of local actors, but simply an engagement with their 
capacities and an attempt to understand how these impact on the peacebuilding process. 
 There are significant and critical agencies within the  'local-local' in BiH already 
developing their own peacebuilding strategies. Some of represent local-local actors, hidden from 
the external donor gaze working on identity and needs related issues. Some translate donor 
frameworks on rights and institutions into local contexts. Some operate within the more visible 
realm of civil society, but maintain transversal connections with local-local actors. The EU tends 
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only to relate to those that are both compliant and visible. However, they create networks of 
meaning from which critical and resistant agency emerges, aimed at making external strategies 
contextually representative and hybrid. 
Taking these into consideration in the peacebuilding process would essentially change the 
role of the EU and produce a less conditional and artificial dialogue with local society. This 
might ultimately require the EUPF to be far more supportive of such critical agency, which may 
also facilitate the reform and accession process (given that it is a long stated goal of governments 
across the region), as well as modify the way the latter is conducted. This in turn requires a 
debate about how a more locally legitimate state could be constructed in the framework of a 
regional approach. It would also entail reconciliation in which politics, autonomy, agency, rights, 
and needs debates were present, rather than merely relying on international institutions and 
frameworks to mitigate unresolved conflict as is currently the case. The liberal peace has not 
managed to take hold in BiH and the EUPF has failed so far in connecting with the local. This 
may well be because, as Chandler has said, the EUPF positions BiH’s politics and people as 
dysfunctional, rather than being open to the interplay of power, political subjectivity, and the loss 
of meaning inherent in the 'death of liberalism', which has occurred in a Bosnian context where 
liberal rights, reconciliation, and autonomy have been subsumed by 'statebuilding'.li Ironically, 
the existing political order has become a hybrid of often corrupt, ethnicized elites and liberal 
frameworks that encounter resistance or are co-opted by those elites.  
 However, local agencies excluded from EU discourses have found hidden spaces in 
which they can develop their own versions of ‘peace’. This in turn has led to emancipation from 
official and visible structures. Such forms of emancipation may not represent the goals of 
international peacebuilding agencies, but can rather be considered as a response to the failure of 
the latter to connect to the diverse range of local agencies. Against this background, the 
challenge for the EU is to search for a peacebuilding framework that is more locally legitimate 
before adopting it as a policy. But this should not be an excuse for a more biopolitical approach 
to emerge, reproducing the EU's vision of itself and its interests. Resistance should be seen as an 
input to the development of peacebuilding strategies, whereby local agencies and autonomy are 
taken seriously for their emancipatory tendencies, and the main focus is placed on responding to 
contextual needs, rights, and society as opposed to institutional and geo-strategic interests. Such 
autonomies and agencies ultimately, as the larger sum of many small and hidden parts, have had 
a far greater impact on peacebuilding than is often suspected. Indeed, it may well be that local 
resistance to the EUPF’s tendency to 'banalize' BiH can be seen as a social and political contract 
in the process of coming into being. 
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